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The Perils and Benefits
of Empirical Research
in International
Investment Arbitration
Chiara Giorgetti*

*

Assistant Professor of Law, Richmond University School of Law, LLM, JSD (Yale). This paper
builds on my commentary to Catherine Roger’s paper and presentation at The Law and Politics of
Foreign Investment Symposium, held at Santa Clara University School of Law on February 1-2,
2013. I greatly benefitted from the discussions and presentations at the Symposium and I would
like to thank all its participants. I am particularly thankful to Catherine Rogers for her excellent
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Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?

Empirical research is the new hot trend in international law.1 An increasing number
of publications include empirical data that aim at strengthening their author’s
argument.2 Indeed, empirical data are used to make an argument less fallible, as the
author’s conclusions are transformed from subjective to objectively proven by the
empirical wrap.
Professor Catherine Rogers’ novel article, The Politics and Empirics of International
Investment Arbitrators, highlights important limitations that empirical data may produce
in international investment law research.3 As such, it is a needed and important
contribution to the understanding and development of this type of scholarship, and
generally to the study of international investment arbitration.
The first part of my commentary evaluates the perils and benefits of empirical
research in international investment arbitration, and concludes that – to be useful –
empirical research must respect certain standards. In the second part, this paper
assesses empirical research based on objective variables to conclude that it can be a
useful tool to study and strengthen international investment arbitration, if properly
used.

I. Empirical Research in International Investment Arbitration
Critics of international investment arbitration routinely affirm that international
arbitration is plagued by irremediable weaknesses.4 They claim that the system either
intrinsically favors the investor, or it is overwhelmed by biased arbitrators, whose
decisions are essentially guided by personal motives.5 For these reasons, they call for
major changes on the core attributes of international investment arbitration.6
Of late, these criticisms have been supported by new empirical data.7 In her paper,
Rogers assesses the state of empirical research relating to investment arbitrators and

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106
AM. J INT’L L. 1 (2012).
Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81
IND. L. J. 141 (2006).
Catherine Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitration, SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.
223 (2013).
Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice: how law firms, arbitrators and financiers
are fueling an investment arbitration boom, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf.
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(2008).
Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339 (2010)
(arguing for a change from party-appointed arbitrator to a list method or neutral-appointing
authority).
See, e.g., Gus van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59
COLUMBIA
FDI
PERSPECTIVES,
(Feb.
6,
2012),
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/content/FDI_Perspectives_eBook_v2_-_Nov_2012.pdf; Irene
Ten Cate, Binders Full of Women . . . Arbitrators?, INTLAWGRRLS (Nov. 2, 2012),

265

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (2013)

criticizes the use of certain empirical data for this purpose.8 Importantly, she highlights
the weakness of the data used and the methodology that produced them.9
In the following part of this paper, I first discuss the benefits and then the perils of
empirical research.

A. The Importance of Empirics
The increasing reliance on empirical data in legal scholarship focused on international
investment arbitration is recent.10 It is especially interesting given that international
investment arbitration itself is a relatively new field, and it signals a keen interest in the
complexity of the subject, from both academics and practitioners. As Rogers suggests,
“[e]mpirical data could, at least theoretically, provide a more firm basis for systematically
evaluating the functioning of investment arbitration.”11
Empirical research on international investment arbitration provides support for the
proposition that arbitrators are not merely “bouchés de la loi” but carry with them their
own experiences when making decisions.12 It, therefore, seeks to answer how these
personal experiences help shape the results of the case.13 Importantly, it also seeks to
examine the appropriateness of any such influence.14

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

14.
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http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/11/binders-full-of-women-arbitrators.html (noting that Brigitte
Stern was appointed 51.61% of the time and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler 22.58%); ICSID
Caseload
Statistics
Issue
#
1
(2013)
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English41.
Rogers, supra note 3, at 229.
Id. at 232-38.
See generally, Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009), and Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2007) (demonstrating the seminal, recent work
regarding the reliance of empirical data in international investment arbitration scholarship).
Rogers, supra note 3, at 232.
Montesquieu proclaimed that judges are merely the “mouth that pronounces the words of the
law,” asserting that the judge did not create or interpret the law, but rather, it only mechanically
applied general principles to concrete situations.
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies: Some
Reflections, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 59, 62 (1995); Giorgio Sacerdoti, Is the party-appointed arbitrator a
“pernicious institution”? A reply to Professor Hans Smit, 35 COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, 1, 2
(Apr. 15, 2011), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/content/party-appointed-arbitrator-perniciousinstitution-reply-professor-hans-smit (writing that rather than being “agents”, arbitrators are
“trustees.”).
Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing
Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J INT’L L. 53, 56-57 (2005) (arguing that “the mirage of absolute
judicial impartiality becomes more distorted when it is superimposed onto the arbitrator.”); See
also David Branson, Sympathetic Party-Appointed Arbitrators: Sophisticated Strangers and
Governments Demand on Them, 25 ICSID REV. FOR. INV. L. J. 367, 368 (2010) (noting that partyappointment of arbitrators is subject to “moral hazard” if “one party-appointed arbitrator sees a
‘duty’ to act for the benefit of the appointing party and the other follows the dictates of the law and
remains neutral, then there is imbalance, the process can be unfair and it can produce injustice.”);
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Indeed, empirical data try to shed light onto the legitimacy crisis of international
arbitration.15 Therefore, it serves a fundamental function of validating the decisions
made by arbitrators.
The problems that arise from the use of empirics in this context are discussed in the
next section.

B. The Innate Weakness of Empirics
The draw to use empirical data to validate an argument is strong. However, its pitfalls
are numerous.16 As discussed below, Rogers describes well the methodological challenges
of empirical research.
First, empirical data used in international investment arbitration often misses the
most essential variable.17 Most often, empirical research relating to investment
arbitration aims at measuring if and how extra-legal factors have contributed to the
outcome of the decision. This research, however, is based on the assumption that it is
somehow possible to control for the correct legal outcome.18 In other words, the research
assumes that there is a correct answer (in the form of a judicial decision) and assumes
that, if and when that desired outcome is not obtained, then external factors have
entered the adjudicative equation.19 But who decides if the correct judicial decision was
taken? The fallacy of this logic is apparent.
Second, too often, international arbitration empirics confound a finding of correlation
with a finding of causation.20 In other words, they perpetuate the “post hoc ergo propter
hoc” logical fallacy. Event B is not caused by Event A only because it occurs after Event
A. Thus, while there may be a correlation between two events, there are many factors
that must be taken into account before causation can be established. Similarly, though

15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

See also Alexis Mourre, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral
Hazard in International Arbitration, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 14, 2010),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-on-janpaulsson%E2%80%99s-moral-hazard-in-international-arbitration/.
See, e.g., Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in
Investment Arbitration, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF
W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821, 824 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010); Jan Paulsson, Moral
Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 339 (2010);
but see Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale:
Why the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy
is Wrongheaded, 29 ARB. INT’L 7 (2013).
Jason Yackee, Do States Bargain Over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater
Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. (forthcoming
2013).
Rogers, supra note 3, at 233.
Id. at 234.
Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behavior in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211 (2012).
Rogers, supra note 3, at 234.
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there may be a correlation between an event (e.g., the appointment of an arbitrator with
a certain background) and the outcome of a particular arbitration, the proof of causation
is an altogether different matter.
Third, empirical data in international arbitration are often embedded by ideology and
policy preferences.21 In fact, the researcher can predetermine the outcome of the study by
attaching certain subjective qualities on the questions asked. Thus, questioning whether
someone or something is “pro-investor” or “pro-State” is already attaching a value
judgment on the issue studied. The truth may indeed just be in the eyes of the beholder.22
Fourth, outcomes can be over-simplified.23 The translation and reading of empirical
data is a complicated and difficult task. This is particularly important because, as
Rogers explains well, in international investment arbitration the content of the decisions
is as much, if not more, important than the outcomes of which empirical research is
based.24
In sum, while empirical research can be a very important instrument to understand
and reform international investment arbitration, to be useful, its limitations must be
understood and internalized. Indeed, it is important to note that most empirical data
used in international investment arbitration research may be faulty because they pertain
essentially to subjective criteria. The empirical studies related to arbitration try to
analyze the qualities of arbitrators or the possible outcomes.
Importantly, these data can be interpreted differently, depending on who does the
reading.25 Indeed, empirical data that try to capture personal qualities of arbitrators can
simply be interpreted as a demonstration that arbitrators’ selection in fact works.26 They
also demonstrate that a well-prepared party can ensure that he or she selects an
arbitrator that has a certain predisposition to issues that are important to the appointing
party.27
As recently declared by an arbitral tribunal deciding – and rejecting - an arbitrator’s
challenge
No arbitrator and, more generally, no human being of a certain age is, in absolute
terms, independent and impartial. Simply put, every individual is conveying ideas and

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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Id. at 237.
Id. at 238; See also Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (2006).
Rogers, supra note 3, at 238.
Id.
Id. at 237-38.
C. Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides? Party Appointed Arbitrators In International Investment
Arbitration And Two Ideas To Improve The System (forthcoming) (on file with the author).
See Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 53 ARB. 219, 223 (1987) (stating “when I
am representing a client in an arbitration, what I am really looking for in a party-nominated
arbitrator is someone with the maximum predisposition towards my client, but with the minimum
appearance of bias.”).
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opinions based on its moral, cultural, and professional education and experience. What is
required, when it comes to rendering judgment in a legal dispute, is the ability to
consider and evaluate the merits of each case, without relying on facts having no relation
to such merits.28 [note that this is quote, please apply the appropriate formatting]
These observations do not imply that empirical research is not useful, on the contrary.
They do imply, however, that we must pay attention to what kind of empirical research is
useful. The next section examines what kind of empirical research is needed; and
namely research that test for objective, not subjective, data.

II. What Empirical Research Is Useful?
When we internalize Rogers’ criticism of empirical data, the issue that remains to be
addressed is how empirical research can still be useful, and what data it should provide.
In the remaining section of this paper, I address this question. This section demonstrates
that empirical research can still be useful, when a question that can only have a yes/no
answer is posited and objective criteria are evaluated.

A. Objective Empirical Research: the example of diversity data
Aside from possible systemic biases, a chief complaint of party-selected arbitrators is
their limited demographic.29 Arbitrators have been typecast as “pale, male and stale.”30
Whether arbitrators lack diversity is an assertion that can be proven empirically.
In fact, data is available to analyze the profile of those who have been selected to sit
on international investment tribunals, taking into consideration gender, nationality,
professional background, legal education, and method of appointment.31

28.

29.
30.

31.

Urbaser S.A. and Consorcio de Aguas Bilbao Bizkaia, Bilbao Biskaia Ur Partzuergoa v. The
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/26, Decision on Claimants' Proposal to Disqualify
Professor Campbell McLachlan, Arbitrator, ¶ 40 (Aug 12, 2010); See also Susan Franck, The Role
of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 505-507 (2006) (noting that “Modern
international arbitration requires the objective application of rules to facts and the exercise of
bounded discretion to ensure that the process and final outcome is warranted. While parties may
pick arbitrators with particular cultural and legal backgrounds and specific personal experiences,
arbitrators also generally have an obligation to disclose those matters that would call into
question their independence. Although all humans are inevitably influenced by the various
experiences in their lives, in international arbitration, parties ask arbitrators to put aside biases –
and fairly and impartially exercise their independent judgment to apply their expertise to the
facts on the record and render a decision based upon the law.”).
Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.
J. 435, 458 (2009).
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C.L.
REV. 1, 75 (2008) (citing Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Présidente: A Woman Who Sits As
President of a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature. Why?, AM. LAW: FOCUS EUR (2004)
(“[A]rbitration is dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered the field. In the words
of Sarah François-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are ‘pale, male, and stale.’”)).
See Giorgetti, supra note 26.
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For example, in relation to geographic diversity, the most recent statistics from the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) show that 68% of all
appointments in cases registered and administered by ICSID are from Western Europe
and North America.32 Specifically, the appointment of arbitrators, conciliators, and ad
hoc Committee Members appointed in cases registered under the ICSID Convention and
the Additional Facility Rules were geographically distributed as follows: 46% from
Western Europe; 22% from North America (Canada, Mexico and the U.S.); 11% from
South America; 10% from South and East Asia and the Pacific; 5% from the Middle East
and North Africa; and 2% each from Central America and the Caribbean and SubSaharan Africa.33
Conversely, only about 6% of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention and
Additional Facility Rules include a State Party from North America or Western Europe.
The data show the following geographical distribution for all ICSID cases by State
Party involved: 1% from Western Europe; 5% from North America (Canada, Mexico and

34

the U.S.); 30% from South America; 9% from South and East Asia and the Pacific; 10%
from the Middle East and North Africa; 6% from Central America and the Caribbean;
and 16% from Sub-Saharan Africa.35
The data are further strengthened by an additional set of data collected by Professors
Michael Waibel and Yanhui Wu. 36 In their data set they find that, interestingly, about
85% of the cases are brought by an investor from a developed country against a
developing country.37 Conversely, only about one third of the arbitrators come from
developing countries.38
In addition to data relating to geographical diversity, it is also possible to collect hard
data on gender diversity. For example, data collected by Gus van Harten show that, as of
May 2010, only 6.5% of all arbitrators appointed in investment treaty arbitration were
women.39 He further notes that the 249 known investment treaty cases until May 2010
generated 631 arbitral appointments.40 Only 41 of these were appointments of women --

32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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These include 704 arbitrators appointed by parties and 230 appointed by ICSID. ICSID, THE
ICSID
CASELOAD
–
STATISTICS
(ISSUE
2013-1)
18-19
(2013),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English41 (last visited Aug. 1, 2013).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 11.
Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, U. OF BONN (2012),
http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/laweconworkshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Van Harten, supra note 7, at 1.
Id.
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just 6.5% of all appointments.41 “Worse,” he says, “of the 247 individuals appointed as
arbitrators across all cases, only 10 were women. Women thus comprised only 4% of
those serving as arbitrators, showing a striking lack of gender balance.”42 The percentage
falls even more to 5.63% when considering ICSID’s more recent appointments.43
Significantly, available data also show that 75% of all female arbitrator appointments
went to two women.44 Without counting their appointments, the percentage of women
arbitrators would be even lower.45 Women account for only 3.49% of appointments made
by the Chairman of the Administrative Counsel of ICSID for all ad hoc annulment
committee members appointed since 2008.46
Aside from data related to diversity, other datasets can prove important for policy
consideration in international investment arbitration.47 For example, data recording
specific preferences by users could inform policy makers.48 In October 2012, for example,
the School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London, and White
& Case LLP released the results of the 2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current
and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process a global survey on practices in
international arbitration which comprised responses from more than 700 practitioners.
The survey showed that, among other things, 76% of respondents preferred selection of
two co-arbitrators by each party unilaterally in a three-member arbitral tribunal.49
Hard data of diversity and data that collect the direct opinion of final users do not
attach value judgments that can result in their subjective interpretations. As discussed
below, they are, therefore, particularly useful guides to policy makers.

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
C. Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration
Tribunals, 28 ARB. INT’L (2012).
See Van Harten, supra note 7, at 1 (also observing that “the story is also almost entirely that
of two women, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Brigitte Stern, who together captured 75% of
appointments of women. In contrast, the two most frequently appointed men accounted for 5%
of the 593 appointments of male arbitrators.”).
Irene Ten Cate, Binders Full of Women . . . Arbitrators?, INTLAWGRRLS (Nov. 2, 2012),
http://www.intlawgrrls.com/2012/11/binders-full-of-women-arbitrators.html (noting that Brigitte
Stern was appointed 51.61% of the time and Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler 22.58%).
Id. (noting “[o]ne might expect to encounter more women in annulment committees, whose
members are appointed by the Chairman of the Administrative Counsel of ICSID. After all,
doesn’t ICSID have greater incentives than parties to consider gender balance? Perhaps not.
Women account for only 3.49% of annulment committee members appointed since 2008.”).
C. Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. (forthcoming).
John Templeman, Looking behind the closed doors of international arbitration, PRACTICAL LAW
COMPANY, Nov. 2012, http://www.whitecase.com/articles-11302012/.
School of International Arbitration at Queen Mary, University of London, and White & Case LLP,
2012 International Arbitration Survey: Current and Preferred Practices in the Arbitral Process,
available at http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/6-522-2998.
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B. The Usefulness of Empirics: Policy Guidance and Reform
Data of diversity and users’ preference give support to the concern expressed in recent
literature as to whether, given the lack of diversity that results from party-selection, the
existing selection procedures result in the selection of the best decision makers.50 They
also provide the overall/outside contour of the policy decision, which support partyappointment of arbitrators.
1.

Policy Guidance: Understanding the Data

First, this kind of data can provide useful guidance for policy makers wishing to
assess the viability of international investment arbitration.
It is generally accepted both at the domestic and international level that “a diverse
judiciary is an indispensable requirement of any democracy.”51 Indeed, the need for
geographical representation is even more important in an international dispute
resolution setting.52 Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin of Canada argued specifically that a
better gender balance between female and male judges would better reflect the
composition of our society and thus more women judges would increase the legitimacy of
the courts, reflect the commitment to equality of our society, be the best use of available
human resources, bring new perspectives, and route out stereotypes.53
The same can be said in support of other types of diversity. Diversity can be beneficial
for several reasons. First, diversity brings more points of view in deliberation, so that a
more comprehensive understanding of the parties’ positions is granted. Thus, diversity
brings better judgments. Second, diversity enhances legitimacy because a more diverse
tribunal better mirrors the composition of society.54 Hence, diversity also results in
stronger judgments.55 Additionally, the lack of diversity, seen together with the increased

50.

51.

52.
53.

54.
55.
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Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 475 (2008-2009) (stating that the perceived
shortcoming of investment arbitration – including the ad hoc appointment of arbitrators – have
led to call for the replacement or “radical redesign of investor-state dispute-settlement
mechanisms.”).
Lady Hale, The Appointment and Removal of Judges: Independence and Diversity Center,
Presented at the International Association of Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference (May 3-7,
2006), in SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS AND POLITICS: DISCUSSION
PAPER 47 (Int’l Courts & Tribunals Ser. 2010).
Id. at 37.
Beverly McLachlin, Why We Need Women Judges, Presented at the International Association of
Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference (May 3-7, 2006), in THE IAWJ: TWENTY YEARS OF
JUDGING FOR EQUALITY, 3 (Mary-Ann Hedlund et al. eds., 2010), www.iawj.org/
JUBILEE_BOOK_IAWJ_WEBSITE_FINAL_1_.pdf; see also Van Harten, supra note 38, at 8; see
also Van Harten, supra note 7, at 8.
McLachlin, supra note 53, at 3.
See id. See also Daniel Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law, 194
LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 309 (Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben eds., 2008)
(analyzing the difficulties of defining the concept of legitimacy in international law); and Nienke
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use of arbitration, will inevitably result in more real or perceived conflicts by selected
arbitrators and thus in more challenges by the parties.56 Indeed, lack of diversity is also
identified as a cause of concern by non-party stakeholders.57
This combination of new data, intense criticism, and increased awareness and practice
of international arbitration has resulted in a call for a reassessment and modification of
the practice of party-appointments.58 Policy reform that can be supported by diversity
data is examined below.
2.

Policy Reform: Ensuring Diversity

Having established that party-appointment of arbitrators is preferred by the users of
arbitration, the issue is then how to respond to the specific criticisms of lack of diversity –
both geographic and gender. This criticism is recognized empirically.59
A measure to better the arbitration system, therefore, would be to increase diversity
by enlarging the pool of selected arbitrators. More arbitrators from outside Europe and
North America, and more women are needed. Diversity could be incorporated in the
applicable legal instruments. However, amending the ICSID Convention, and amending
UNCITRAL and PCA rules to mandate diversity, would hardly be possible.60
Possibly, other methods could be adopted to enhance diversity. First, several actions to
enlarge the pool of arbitrators can be taken directly by the neutral appointing authorities
when making selection. Second, the parties can also play a role in reaching that goal.
i. Actions By Appointing Authorities and Secretariat
The neutral authorities that participate in the selection of arbitrators can directly
adopt several targeted measures to enhance diversity, and at different stages in the

56.
57.
58.

59.
60.

Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107
(analyzing legitimacy in international courts and tribunals involving States as litigants).
Jeremy Sharpe, Introductory Note, 51 ILM 350 (2012).
See Corporate Europe Observatory, PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE: HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS
AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION BOOM (Nov. 2012),
http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profiting-from-injustice.pdf.
Jan Paulsson, Are Unilateral Appointments Defensible?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 2,
2009), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/04/02/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible/
(criticizing the mechanism of appointment of arbitrators by party and suggesting possible
alternatives, including selection by a neutral institution or the use of list for the appointment of all
arbitrators, following the example of the Court of Arbitration for Sport); and Alexis Mourre, Are
Unilateral Appointments Defensible? On Jan Paulsson’s Moral Hazard in International
Arbitration,
KLUWER
ARBITRATION
BLOG
(Oct.
5,
2010),
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/10/05/are-unilateral-appointments-defensible-on-janpaulsson’s-moral-hazard-in-international-arbitration/.
See supra Part II.A.
Experts agree that is would be impossible to amend the ICSID Convention and to gather support
for an amendment mandating stricter selection rules.
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proceedings that do not require any specific mandate by Member States. Three measures
are particularly relevant.
First and foremost, appointing authorities should promote diversity when they select
co- and presiding arbitrators or members of ad hoc annulment committees. Specifically,
for example, the Administrative Council Chairman, the ICSID Secretary General and the
PCA Secretary General can include new and diverse candidates in the lists of three
candidates given to the parties for selection.
Second, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council more specifically can
further diversity by selecting the ten members of the Panel of Arbitrators he or she has
the right to select. In his last selection in 2012, the Chairman designated only three
women out of ten designations.61 Though other diversity requirements were considered,
more could be done at the institution level.
Third, the Secretary General of ICSID could urge ICSID Contracting States to
nominate the arbitrators in the ICSID Panel of Arbitrators with the objective of
advancing diversity. Each Contracting State has a Convention right to nominate four
people in the Panel of Arbitrators, who do not necessarily have to be nationals of the
nominating State.62 Members of the Arbitrator Panels are important; the Chairman of
the Administrative Council must select members of the panel to nominate the presiding
arbitrators, if the parties fail to agree. Panel members are also used to nominate
members of ad hoc annulment committees and arbitrators that the parties have failed to
nominate. Thus, a list that contains more names of potential arbitrators will offer the
Chairman of the Administrative Council more choice. At the moment, about a third of the
parties to the ICSID Convention do not avail themselves of that right and nominate
members to the List of Arbitrators.63 If more parties to the Convention nominated diverse
arbitrators, diversity would increase substantially. For example, there could be a yearly
reminder sent to parties urging them to make selections.

61.
62.

63.
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See supra Part II.A.
Under the ICSID Convention “The Centre maintains a Panel of Conciliators and a Panel of
Arbitrators pursuant to Articles 12-16 of the ICSID Convention. Each ICSID Contracting State
may designate up to four persons to each Panel. The designees may, but need not, be nationals of
the designating country. In addition, up to ten persons may be designated by the Chairman of the
ICSID Administrative Council. Each designee normally serves for a renewable term of six years.”
See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&Pa
geType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement129.
At present, 108 out of the 158 member states have made some forms of arbitrators’ selection. See
ICSID, Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators, ICSID/10 at 3-5 (Jan. 2013),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&reqFrom=ICSIDPanels&language=English.

Is the Truth in the Eyes of the Beholder?

ii. Actions By Parties
Although most of the new nominations will likely result from appointments by the
neutral appointing authority, parties can also be urged to include diversity in their
choice. Many governments, which by definition are one of the parties to the dispute,
have policies mandating diversity.64 These policies should also be used for the selection of
arbitrators and the nomination of members of the panel of arbitrators. Further, best
practices given to parties can provide background and reinforce the importance of
diversity and new appointments.
Although these measures will take time to ensure concrete results, these soft
measures would ensure that a larger pool of arbitrators is available. Importantly,
because they have been vetted by practice, these arbitrators will find support within the
international arbitration practitioner circle.

III.Conclusion
Empirical research can provide useful data to understand international investment
arbitration and guide its reform. It is important, however, that empirical data is used
correctly.
Rogers’ important article gives a valuable warning of the challenges that empirical
research can face. She describes and assesses well the methodological pitfalls of empirical
research and how they can influence reform proposals.
This commentary seeks to push the discussion one step forward, and guide reform on
the issue of diversity, based on available empirical findings.

64.

For the UK policy, for example, see Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales and Senior
Presidents of Tribunals, Equality and Diversity Policy for the Judiciary (Oct. 2012),
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Guidance/equality_diversity.pdf.
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